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VOTER ID: COMBATING VOTER FRAUD OR DISENFRANCHISING ? A
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF VOTER ID LAWS, NATIVE
AMERICAN DISENFRANCHISEMENT , AND THEIR INTERSECTION
Will Hyland*
ABSTRACT
This note discusses the contentious issue of voter ID laws and
their ability to disproportionately affect various racial and ethnic
groups, with specific attention paid to such laws’ effects on Native
Americans. Since the 2000 election catastrophe and subsequent
changes to our election system, voter ID laws have become a hotbutton issue. Many states have enacted voter ID laws in the years since,
some of which have resulted in restrictive voting requirements that
may
result
in
disproportionately
discriminatory
voter
disenfranchisement. This note willa first give a general overview of the
complicated and convoluted recent development voter ID laws, a
history of Native American disenfranchisement, and then compare the
stories of voter ID laws used in the states of North Dakota and
Washington, two states which both have high populations of
indigenous citizens living both on reservations and on non-tribal
lands. While North Dakota’s voter ID law requirements have worked
in practice to discriminate many Native American citizens living on
reservations, Washington’s recently amended voter ID law and other
changes to its election laws have attempted to address these concerns
efficiently and inexpensively, though more time is needed to see their
true effect. The note will conclude by arguing that, while courts can
help to eradicate these laws, a shift in the mindset of policymakers is
the most effective and efficient way to eliminate targeted
discrimination in our voting laws.

*
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, weeks before the midterm elections in North Dakota,
hundreds of Native American voters from the Spirit Lake Tribe
discovered that they may have been disenfranchised. In complying
with recent decision regarding the state’s voter identification law,
Native Americans who planned to vote had to obtain residential
addresses to place on their IDs.1 However, without their knowledge,
1

Danielle McLean, New North Dakota ID Restriction Threatens Native
Americans’ Ability to Vote, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 2, 2018, 7:26 PM),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/exclusive-new-voter-id-restriction-in-northdakota-threatens-hundreds-of-natives-ability-to-vote-49937a379793/.
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local emergency services changed their addresses in the state’s central
voter database.2 Some absentee ballots were rejected, and
subsequently, an election advocate discovered that county officials
were requiring addresses on ID cards to match the addresses in the
database.3 Native Americans living on reservations often do not have
residential mailing addresses,4 so there is a heightened danger that the
addresses they have on their IDs could be changed in the voter
database by the government, as seen when another tribal member
discovered that his residential address was assigned to a nearby bar,
meaning he would be committing fraud if he had voted under that
address.5 If these massive mistakes had not been discovered, it is likely
that hundreds of Native American voters would have shown up to the
polls, only to have their right to vote taken away from them because
of an action unilaterally taken by the government of which they had
no knowledge.6 While the actual legitimacy of the North Dakota voter
ID law will be discussed later on, it is not a good sign that the North
Dakota government is even capable of disenfranchising those who are
attempting to following the law’s strict requirements.
Who has right to vote? It is a question that has been asked over
and over again since our inception as a country. Our Constitution
provides some answers, protecting the right to vote in federal elections
in its original form7 and applying that protection to the states seventynine years later with the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.8 Additionally, the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), first
enacted in 1965 and currently reauthorized through 2032, the seminal
piece
of
federal
legislation
protecting
against
voter
disenfranchisement, is in place to protect against discriminatory

2

Id.
Id.
4
Patty Ferguson-Bohnee, How the Native American Vote Continues to Be
Suppressed, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/voting-rights/ho
w-the-native-american-vote-continues-to-be-suppressed/.
5
Id.
6
McLean, supra note 1.
7
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
8
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3
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voting laws.9 However, even with all of these protections, states and
political subdivisions have continued to find new ways to
disenfranchise their populations, often couching that rationale beneath
a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for enacting certain laws.
Voter ID laws, laws requiring prospective voters to show an
acceptable form of identification prior to registering or voting, have
been one example of this recent trend, and they have been a
contentious issue since their popularization began shortly after the
2000 election. While there may be some legitimate reasons for these
laws to exist, and while some states adhere mostly to those legitimate
reasons in passing and enforcing their voter ID laws, other states have
taken advantage of such laws and have used them as pretexts for
discriminatory disenfranchisement. One particularly appalling
example of this trend is the state of North Dakota, which passed a voter
ID law that is still in effect today10 and had a clear discriminatory effect
on Native Americans living on reservations until a consent decree
entered into last year ameliorated most of those effects. In comparison,
the state of Washington, in response to the controversy surrounding
North Dakota’s voter ID law, amended its own voter ID law as part of
a recently enacted Native American Voting Rights Act.11 The law is
able to maintain an acceptable rationale behind having voter ID laws
in the first place while directly seeking to expunge any discriminatory
effects on Native Americans living in the state. States with a large
Native American population should follow Washington’s approach
and ensure protection of the right to vote without placing a serious
burden on otherwise eligible Native American voters. State
legislatures should also follow Washington’s approach of actively
protecting the civil rights of its citizens instead of prioritizing their
own political power.
Part II of this paper will discuss the recent history that led to
the recent explosion of voter ID laws and will define the four different
broad categories of voter ID laws that have been employed by different
states. Part III will summarize the historical practice of Native
American disenfranchisement and emphasize why it is so important
9

52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10702.
See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 16.1-01-04.1, 16.1-05-07.
11
See Native American Voting Rights Act, S.B. 5079, 66th Leg., (Wash. 2019).
10
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to make sure that Native Americans will be truly enfranchised in every
election in which they desire to exercise their right to vote, a
fundamental right. Part IV will discuss North Dakota’s voter ID law
saga and where it stands today, while also briefly mentioning
Washington’s recent voter ID law change and how it should be a
harbinger of a major shift towards greater protection against Native
American disenfranchisement on a statewide level. Part V will
emphasize the importance of these issues and propose a solution as to
how these discriminatory voter ID laws can be eliminated in an
efficient manner.
I.

HISTORY AND GENERAL O VERVIEW OF VOTER ID LAWS

The state of elections in the United States changed dramatically
after the 2000 presidential election. The events that occurred in the
state of Florida live in infamy, and in response to that widely
recognized debacle, election law was slowly overhauled on both the
federal and state levels. While both sides of the political spectrum
acknowledged that there was a problem that needed to be addressed,
they did not agree about what the problem was. The Florida Election
Report, an investigation and conducted by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, served both as a microcosm of the
ideological split between parties and as an informative look at what
problem would ultimately be addressed by the Department of Justice
in the future.12
A.

The Florida Election Report and “Voter Fraud”

The events that transpired in Florida leading up to, during, and
after election day in 2000 shocked the country. While many most
strongly remember the recount issue that eventually ended up in the
Supreme Court,13 Florida was plagued with a number of other serious
problems as well, including accusations of widespread and
disproportionate voter disenfranchisement due to a number of
12

U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/
report/main.htm.
13
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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actions.14 A thorough investigation was needed to discern how and
why the election disaster happened, and the answers would
eventually be found in the Florida Election Report, conducted by the
United States Commission of Civil Rights. The Commission,
composed at the time of eight appointed members (four Democrat,
three independent, one Republican),15 investigated the veracity of
numerous practices and policies that allegedly contributed to voter
disenfranchisement and who was responsible for the decisions that
eventually brought about these claims.16 It held a number of public
hearings and heard from hundreds of witnesses across the spectrum,
including the governor of Florida, state officials, experts on election
law and reform, and Florida citizens and registered voters.17
After many months of investigation, the Commission
concluded that Florida had indeed violated the Voting Rights Act. In
so finding, the Commission uncovered a number of actions leading up
to and during election day that resulted in the disenfranchisement of
African American and minority voters, with African American voters
having had a ten times greater chance of having their ballots rejected
as compared to white voters.18 The Commission attributed this
discrepancy in ballot rejection frequency was attributed to a number
of factors.19 One of these factors was the use of antiquated voting
systems in counties with large minority populations, which resulted in
more votes being spoiled in these counties as compared to wealthier
counties with a greater percentage of white voters.20 Another factor
was the use of purge lists. Used to remove ineligible voters from
registration rolls, including all convicted felons (who at this time were

14

See Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter
Disenfranchisement, THE NATION (Jul. 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/art
icle/archive/how-the-2000-election-in-florida-led-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenf
ranchisement/.
15
Florida Election Bias ‘Exposed in Report’, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2001),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jun/05/uselections2000.usa.
16
U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at introduction, https://www.
usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/intro.htm.
17
Id.
18
Id. at Ch. 9.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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not allowed to vote in Florida for the rest of their lives unless the
governor granted them clemency),21 deceased, duplicate, and mentally
incompetent voters, these lists were poorly maintained by election
officials in the leadup to the 2000 election.22 The Commission
emphasized this point by discussing Miami-Dade County, where
about one out of every seven names on the county’s purge list was
erroneous, and while some of these voters were able to appeal and
remain on the rolls, other voters either did not know they were on the
list or were not successful in their appeals.23 Additionally, the
Committee found that the purge lists had a disparate impact on
Florida’s African American population, as they were more likely to be
found on the purge lists than persons of other races, increasing the
likelihood of discriminatory disenfranchisement.24 The Committee
concluded that these factual findings showed a violation of section 2
of the Voting Rights Act and that litigation should be pursued against
those responsible, including state and local election officials, the
secretary of state, and governor Jeb Bush to ensure compliance with
the VRA in future Florida elections.25
While the majority of the Civil Rights Commission signed onto
the report, two dissenters had a markedly different view of the
situation. Commissioners Abigail Thernstrom and Russell G.
Redenbaugh, both noted for holding more conservative viewpoints at
this time,26 attacked the conclusions drawn by the majority of the
Committee in the Report. They argued that the Committee of relying
on a flawed statistical analysis for its claim of disenfranchisement and
accused the Committee of allowing partisan interests to jeopardize the

21

See FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VI, § 4(a); see FLA. STAT. § 940.01(1) (2021); see
Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CENTER (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-rights-restorati
on-efforts-florida.
22
U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at Ch. 1.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at Ch. 9.
26
See Charlie Savage, Maneuver Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel,
BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 6, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2007/11/06/maneuver_gave_bush_a_conservative_rights_panel/?page=full.
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public’s belief in a bedrock concept of American democracy.27 In
addition to questioning the Committee for what they did investigate
and conclude, the dissenters criticized the majority for what they failed
to investigate.28 With specific reference to the aforementioned purge
lists, the dissenters stated that there was no proof of eligible voters
being denied the right to vote and that, in reality, the greater issue that
required investigation was the reports of ineligible felons (and other
ineligible voters) having their votes counted because they were not on
the lists.29 Thernstrom and Redenbaugh disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that this “voter fraud” issue was “beyond the scope” of the
investigation and not a major factor in the election, stating that it was
“unconscionable” that the Commission made no effort to investigate
these “widely-publicized allegations of fraud.”30 Given that the
dissent’s report was more aligned with the Executive’s viewpoints at
this time31 and much less critical of the President’s brother,32 it is
unsurprising that the new administration’s focus in addressing the
concerns raised by the 2000 election followed that report’s lead (calling
for investigation into “voter fraud”) instead of the majority report
(calling for investigations into voter disenfranchisement).33
The “voter fraud” terminology has been used long before this
report, however. In its simplest form, voter fraud is “when individuals
27

ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & RUSSELL G. REDENBAUGH, THE FLORIDA ELECTION
REPORT: DISSENTING STATEMENT 1 (July 19, 2001), https://media4.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/final_dissent.pdf.
28
Id. at 8.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 49.
31
See, e.g., id. at 9, 28, 49, 51.
32
Compare U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at Ch. 9,
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/ch3.htm (“The U.S. Department of
Justice should initiate the litigation process against the governor regarding his
failure to appoint special officers to investigate alleged election law violations that
discriminated against people of color. Appropriate enforcement action should be
initiated to ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”) with
THERNSTROM AND REDENBAUGH, supra note 27, at 2, 5, 7–8, 43 (arguing that the
Committee had a vendetta against the governor, blamed him for occurrences he
was not responsible for, and treated him unfairly when he was called in as a
witness).
33
Berman, supra note 14.
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cast ballots despite knowing that they are ineligible to vote,”34 i.e.,
voter impersonation. However, the term has been morphed over the
years to be the “go-to” reason for any form of election irregularity that
takes place.35 This mislabeling, often borne out of a politically strategic
fear-mongering mentality, distracts attention from real issues and
excuses the policy of passing unnecessary and discriminatory
legislation that both suppress otherwise legitimate voters and serve no
actual purpose.36 And while actual in-person voter fraud has occurred
in the past, the Brennan Center’s thorough report studying numerous
found incident rates between .0003 percent and .0025 percent, meaning
there is a higher chance of a person being struck by lightning than a
person committing in-person voter fraud.37 The Thernstrom dissent
foreshadowed what was coming in the next decade: the voter ID law
revolution. And as discussed in Part IV infra, the “voter fraud”
justification in this area can have dire consequences for otherwise
eligible voters.
B.
HAVA, Voter ID Popularization, & Nuts and Bolts of
Voter ID Laws
Before the 2000 election, fourteen states had already enacted
some form of voter ID law.38 South Carolina was the earliest to the
party, enacting the first voter ID law in 1950, while the second state to
do so, Hawaii, did so twenty years later.39 These early state laws were
adopted with little uproar, and at this point, there was no clear
34

Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1,
4 (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Tru
th-About-Voter-Fraud.pdf.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 4, 6.
37
Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Briefing_Memo_Deb
unking_Voter_Fraud_Myth.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). [hereinafter Voter
Fraud Myth]. This document contains scores of more studies illustrating the rarity
of voter fraud.
38
Voter ID History, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 31,
2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.a
spx [hereinafter NCSL ID History].
39
Id.
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evidence of political ideology impacting their adoptions.40
Importantly, in all of these fourteen states, if voters failed to abide by
the identification requirement, provisions remained in place so that
they could still cast a regular ballot on election day.41
In 1993, Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act42
(“NVRA”), also commonly known as the “Motor Voter Act,”43 which
sought to simplify the registration process and make voting easier for
Americans.44 In expanding voter registration and abridging the ways
in which states could remove voters from their registration lists,45 the
NVRA caused strife among some state legislatures, who complained
that it would be now more difficult than ever to prevent “voter
fraud.”46 The fervor of these fraud concerns was catalyzed by the
razor-thin Florida results in 2000 and the controversy surrounding the
purge lists, though it is plausible that lackadaisical maintenance of
voter registration rolls was an equal if not greater causal factor.47
Nonetheless, the passage of the Help America Vote Act48
(“HAVA”) in 2002 was an important step in addressing concerns over
the electoral system stemming from 2000. Much of the Act was focused
on modernizing election technology and creating more federal

40

Id.
Id.
42
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–1973gg-10, currently codified at 52
U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511).
43
See id. at § 20504 (allows citizens to register to vote and apply for a driver’s
license simultaneously).
44
See About the National Voter Registration Act, THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/crt/aboutnational-voter-registration-act.
45
See id. at § 20507.
46
Eugene D. Mazo, Finding Common Ground on Voter ID Laws, 49 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1233, 1237 (2019) (citing LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY
LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 321–
22 (1996)).
47
See U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at Ch. 1.
48
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (originally
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545, currently codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–
21145).
41
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oversight in the organization and administration of federal elections.49
The Act also addressed the registration problem, requiring states to
create computerized voter registration lists and procedures for
accurately maintaining them, which includes verifying voter
information contained in a registration application through an
applicant’s driver’s license, social security number, or, if the applicant
has neither, an assigned voter identification number.50 And most
pertinently, HAVA imposed certain, limited identification
requirements for states to impose.51 First, if a voter’s name does not
appear on the registration lists or their eligibility is otherwise
challenged at the polls, HAVA mandates that the voter has a right to
cast a provisional ballot,52 a ballot which can be set aside on election
day and either counted or discarded after an investigation into the
voter’s uncertain eligibility.53 Additionally, first-time voters in a State
who registered for a federal election by mail were now required to
present valid photo identification before casting their ballot, whether
they decided to vote in-person or by mail.54 If photo ID is unavailable,
HAVA does allow for other enumerated forms of identification to
suffice.55 These requirements are the bare minimum, and the Act
makes sure to note that states are free to impose more stringent voter
ID laws if they so desire.56
To satisfy the requirements of HAVA, many states were forced
to pass new legislation. With regard to the voter ID requirement, fortyfour states were not in compliance at the time the Act became law in
late 2002, and legislative action on this issue thus became mandatory

49

52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21072.
52 U.S.C. § 21083(a).
51
52 U.S.C. § 21083(b).
52
52 U.S.C. § 21802.
53
Provisional Ballots, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept.
17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisionalballots.aspx [hereinafter NCSL Provisional].
54
52 U.S.C. § 21083(b)(1-2).
55
52 U.S.C. § 21083(b)(2)(A)(i-ii)(II) (requiring “a copy of a current utility bill,
bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that
shows the name and address of the voter” if the voter lacks valid photo
identification).
56
52 U.S.C. § 21084.
50
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and imminent.57 Even though HAVA’s identification requirements
were only for federal elections, states often decided to apply its
requirements to their own state elections as well, as the systems for
running each kind of election are so intertwined that, for overall
convenience, a change to one will most often lead to a change in the
other.58 States also took notice of the express HAVA provision
allowing them to enact stricter requirements, and this provision gave
legislators who may already have been interested in enacting voter ID
provisions an opening to put their ideas into action. 59 By 2007, thirtyfour states had passed voter ID legislation with stricter requirements
than HAVA’s minimum standards.60
Presently, thirty-five states have voter ID laws that are
operational.61 While they all are generally aimed at attacking the same
issues of election integrity, there is variability among states as to the
type of requirements they see as achieving that goal in the present
landscape. While some of the schemes may overlap, the National
Conference of State Legislatures (“NCSL”) has grouped state voter ID
laws generally into four categories: strict photo ID, non-strict photo ID,
strict non-photo ID, and non-strict non-photo ID.62 Each of these
categories has different impacts on voter participation, as the more
restrictive laws tend to disenfranchise more voters due to their
restrictive requirements, while the less restrictive laws tend to make it
easier for a voter to have their vote counted even if they do not show
the required identification.63
Among these four different categories, there are two
significant differences. First, there is the more easily discernible

57

Mazo, supra note 46, at 1239.
Samuel P. Langholz, Fashinoning a Constitutional Voter Identification
Requirement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 731, 747 n. 84 (citing Robert S. Montjoy, HAVA
and the States, in ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY 16, 33 n. 1 (Daniel
J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser eds., 2005)).
59
Mazo, supra note 46, at 1239–40.
60
Id. at 1240.
61
Voter Identification Requirements, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/voter-id.aspx [hereinafter NCSL Voter ID].
62
Id.
63
Id.
58
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distinction between states who require photo identification and states
who do not. For this requirement, the thirty-five states are split nearly
evenly, as eighteen require some form of photo identification while
seventeen do not, accepting other documents, such as bank statements,
birth certificates, utility bills or passports which verify a voter’s
identity.64 Some states may find numerous forms of identification
acceptable,65 while others may limit acceptable forms to a small
number of documents.66
The second, more complex distinction is between strict and
non-strict laws. Strict voter ID laws make it more difficult for a voter
to have their vote counted when they show up to the polls without the
proper identification.67 For example, a state may require a voter to fill
out a provisional ballot and then require the voter to take extra steps
to guarantee that ballot is counted, such as going back to the election
office within a certain time period after the election with the proper
identification.68 Conversely, non-strict voter ID laws allow for more
flexibility if the voter lacks the proper identification at the polls.69 For
example, a state may allow the vote to count without additional action
required from the voter, such as by requiring the voter to sign an
affidavit at the polls affirming that he or she is the person who is listed
on the election record,70 allowing election officials to waive the ID
requirement if they know the voter’s identity,71 or allowing the voter
to submit a provisional ballot and having election officials, after
closing of the polls, unilaterally determine whether the voter was
otherwise eligible and registered to vote. This latter option can be
achieved through different verification methods. Most states use a
signature match with records from the voter’s registration record,72

64

Id.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.043(1)(a) (2021).
66
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-6.1 (2021).
67
NCSL Voter ID, supra note 61.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 4937(a) (2021).
71
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.225(b) (2021).
72
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.043(1)(b) (2021); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 1315-107(2) (2021).
65
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through some states require additional information to be matched
with the registration database.73
C.

Constitutional Challenges to Voter ID Laws

There has been a plethora of legal challenges to voter ID laws
in the last twenty years, at both the federal and state levels. Challenges
to these laws are usually brought either on constitutional grounds or
under the VRA. The most notable challenge, and the only voter ID case
to ever reach the Supreme Court,74 has been to Indiana’s voter ID law,
which was passed in 2005 and is still one of the most restrictive in the
nation. Named Senate Election Law 483 (“SEA 483”), this strict photo
ID law requires in-person voters to present a photo ID before voting
on election day.75 While Indiana does not provide an enumerated list
of acceptable forms of identification, it does provide a list of four
requirements for the identification document to be accepted at the
polls.76 If voters are unable to meet the identification requirement on
election day, they may vote on a provisional ballot.77 For this
provisional ballot to be counted, the voter must appear before the
circuit court clerk or county election board within ten days of the
election.78 While there, the voter must produce the proper
identification or execute an affidavit stating that they are not able to
obtain the proper identification due to indigence or a religious
objection to being photographed.79 If the voter was asked to vote
provisionally for an additional reason, the validity of that reason will
73

See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 § 7-114(B)(2) (2021) (requiring the affidavit signed
when casting the provisional ballot to contain a matching name, residence address,
date of birth, and driver’s license or SSN number to the voter registration database
for the provisional ballot to be counted).
74
Mazo, supra note 46, at 1247.
75
See IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (2021).
76
Id. § 3-5-2-40.5 (The ID must contain: (1) the name of the individual, which
must conform to the name in the voter’s registration record; (2) a photograph of
the voter; (3) an expiration date, which must not be expired or, if expired, must
have expired after the most recent general election; and (4) must have been issued
by the state of Indiana or the United States).
77
Id. § 3-10-1-7.2(d).
78
Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a).
79
Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b-c).
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have to also be determined and resolved before the ballot can be
counted.80
Almost immediately after this law was enacted, the Indiana
Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central
Committee filed suit in federal court, arguing that the law was facially
unconstitutional, substantially burdening the right to vote in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.81 Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board reached the Supreme Court, and in a
fractured plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens, who was
joined only by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts,82 the Court
affirmed the lower court rulings and upheld the law.83 The Court
began by summarizing the legal precedent to determine the standard
of review.84 It concluded that, to determine this law’s constitutionality,
a balancing test must be employed which weighs the burden the law
places on voters, however slight, against “relevant and legitimate state
interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.”85 This standard,
weighing the “asserted injury to the right to vote against the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule,”86 is known as the Anderson/Burdick balancing
standard. It is unique to voting regulations, which are not subject to
strict scrutiny if they are deemed to not impose a “severe” burden on
the right to vote.87
The Court first held that Indiana had several legitimate
interests behind the statute, including protecting election integrity
through the maintenance of accurate voter registration lists in
compliance with NVRA and HAVA, combating voter fraud, and
80

Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(e).
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186–87 (2008).
82
A separate concurrence, only in the judgment itself, was authored by Justice
Scalia, who was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito. Thus, the law was
upheld 6-3, but the rationale for upholding it was split down the middle. Stevens’
opinion is the controlling opinion, however.
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Id. at 188–89.
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Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190–91.
85
Id. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed., 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
86
Id. at 190 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
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See generally Mazo, supra note 46, at 1250 n.97 (describing the development
of the Anderson/Burdick standard of review); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428
(1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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protecting public confidence in the integrity of the democratic
process.88 Concerning voter fraud in particular, the Court held that,
although the record contained no evidence of any in-person fraud
occurring in Indiana in the entire history of the state, historical
instances of such fraud in other areas of the country and the need for
accurate recordkeeping and orderly administration of elections are
enough to overcome the wanting evidence of actual fraud.89 Turning
to the other side of the scale, the Court held that the petitioners failed
to present enough evidence of the voter ID law excessively burdening
any class of voters to a degree great enough to outweigh Indiana’s
legitimate interests, and thus, the facial challenge to the statute was
insufficient.90 The Court explained that the record lacked concrete
evidence of difficulties faced by elderly, indigent, or religious voters
as a result of the statute, and it held that the small number of examples
provided by the petitioners were only enough to show a “limited
burden on voters’ rights.”91 To some, the plurality’s analysis did
seemingly leave the door open for future “as-applied” constitutional
challenges (where a law is challenged for how it is applied by the state,
not on its face) if the plaintiffs could show the illegitimate application
of the law on the record.92
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, attacked
the plurality’s improper use of the Burdick standard, noting that a State
must do more than invoke abstract interests; it also must “make a
particular factual showing that the threats to its interests outweigh the
particular impediments it has imposed.”93 In first analyzing the
impediments, Souter and Ginsburg find there to be a considerable

88

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191–97.
Id. at 194–97.
90
Id. at 202–03.
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Id. at 203.
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See L. Paige Whitaker, Legal and Constitutional Issues Regarding Photo ID
Laws, in State Voter Identification Requirements: Analysis, Legal Issues, and
Policy Considerations 12 (2016), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metad
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Crawford, 553 U.S. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a
separate opinion in dissent.
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number, including the burden of travel costs in obtaining the ID,94 the
inadequate provisional ballot exception,95 and the District Court’s
finding that approximately 43,000 Indiana residents lack the proper
identification and thus will bear these burdens, with a large proportion
of that group likely struggling economically.96 The dissent stated that
the impediments resulting from the voter ID law would likely
discourage a significant group of poor and disabled people from
voting, and therefore, a much more thorough examination of the
State’s interests was required (as compared to the examination
conducted by the plurality).97
The dissent discredited all of Indiana’s asserted interests.
Dealing first with voter fraud, Souter and Ginsburg described the
fictitiousness of this interest and its relation to the Indiana voter ID
law. They did so by first showing that this law only combats in-person
voter fraud, which there is no evidence of in Indiana’s history and very
little evidence nationwide.98 While the State argued this dearth of
evidence was due to impersonation fraud being hard to detect, Souter
and Ginsburg provided the much more rational explanation: that it
would likely be the easiest type of fraud to detect because the fraud
would be occurring out in the open.99 Additionally, the incentives for
doing it are almost non-existent, as it was a felony offense in Indiana,
and a single fraudulent vote would never change an election in any
meaningful way; moreover, while an organized group of fraudulent

94

Id. at 211–216 (explaining that voters need to travel to the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles (“BMV”) to obtain the ID, a trip which is complicated due to a small
number of BMVs per precinct, limited public transportation, and the requirement
to pay at least one fee for corresponding documents needed for the ID to be
issued).
95
Id. at 216–18 (explaining the ten-day requirement, demonstrating that an
indigent person or religious objector will have to go through the process every
time they want to vote, and showing empirical data from a prior municipal election
where only ~5% of provisional voters were able to follow the steps to have their
votes counted).
96
Id. at 218–21.
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Id. at 222–23.
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Id. at 226–27.
99
Id. at 227.
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voters could have a slightly greater impact, such a plan would be much
more difficult to conceal.100
Souter and Ginsburg quickly dismissed Indiana’s remaining
asserted interests. First, they described the interest in fixing bloated
voter rolls as nothing more than Indiana attempting to benefit from
negligent maintenance of its own registration lists.101 The dissenters
found this to weaken the State’s fraud argument even more, as Indiana
is seemingly more interested in correcting a potential symptom of the
bloated lists (impersonation) by restricting the right to vote, when in
reality, it could achieve the same result by competently managing the
lists.102 Finally, Indiana’s interest in safeguarding voter confidence also
failed scrutiny, as the State showed nothing to suggest that its voters
doubted the integrity of their electoral process.103 On this record,
Souter and Ginsburg concluded that the serious burdens placed on
certain groups as a result of this voter ID law greatly outweigh the
State’s asserted interests behind its enactment.104
Crawford has continued to be a controversial decision to this
day, namely because it has allowed states to use the abstract interest
of “preventing voter fraud” to pass strict voter ID laws and thus has
made it challenging to facially attack the constitutionality of these
laws.105 Justice Stevens has come to regret writing this decision, stating
in 2014 that while he believes it was the “correct” outcome given the
poor record established by the plaintiffs in the case, he also believes
that, in general, voter ID laws are unnecessary and “not a good
idea.”106 The famous Judge Richard Posner, who wrote the 2-1 majority
decision at the appellate level, went even further, stating in 2013 that
at the time of the decision, he did not realize these identification laws
would be used to disenfranchise otherwise-qualified voters and
referred to Indiana’s voter ID law as “a type of law now widely
100
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regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of fraud
prevention.”107 The difficulties created by Crawford have led some
attorneys to seek new legal strategies to attack restrictive voter ID
laws, the most notable of which has been challenges brought under
Section 2 of the VRA.
D.

Section 2 Challenges to Voter ID Laws

The original section 2 was very similar to the Fifteenth
Amendment108 but with the ability of better enforcement of those
principles. In the 1982 reauthorization of the VRA, in response to a
restrictive Supreme Court decision interpreting section 2,109 Congress
amended it to also proscribe laws that are “facially neutral” but have
discriminatory effects on protected groups.110 The barring of laws with
a discriminatory effect, also known as a “disparate impact,” was an
exercise of Congress’ power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment
through legislation.111 Historically, many of the cases arising under
section 2 and using the “effects” framework tend to be challenges to
“vote dilution” practices, which involve at-large schemes such as
redistricting, that work to lessen the impact of a protected group’s
vote.112 But the section’s reach has also reached “vote denial” practices,
or those practices that work to disenfranchise certain groups
altogether.113 This latter category contains many historically attacked
practices, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and language or color107

Mazo, supra note 46, at 1251 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS OF
JUDGING 84–85 (2013)).
108
Voting Rights Act, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
109
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980) (The Court held that a
“discriminatory purpose” on the part of lawmakers was required to establish a
violation under section 2).
110
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (“no voting qualification or prerequisite for voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied . . . in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color . . . .”) (emphasis added).
111
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
112
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act.
113
Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006).

302

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 29

specific requirements for voting, though all of these specific practices
were barred from use when effects claims became pursuable in 1982.114
Voter ID laws have been a relatively new addition to this “vote denial”
category, and while on the whole, they are not as blatantly
discriminatory as those Jim Crow era voting laws, they can be used to
achieve results similar to those despicable historical practices. Because
the use of section 2 to attack voter ID laws specifically is in its legal
infancy, the case law in this area is somewhat divergent and sparse,
especially on the discriminatory effects front.115 However, some courts
have found section 2 violations stemming from voter ID laws in recent
years.116
One such case challenged Texas’ voter identification law,
known as Senate Bill 14 (“SB 14”), and the Fifth Circuit thoroughly
outlined the modern section 2 approach to vote denial challenges. The
Texas law was similarly restrictive to Indiana’s and fell into the strict
photo ID category, becoming effective in 2013 and being challenged on
multiple grounds, including both discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory effect section 2 claims.117 After an arduous litigation
process which spawned one appellate opinion,118 the Fifth Circuit
reheard the case en banc a year later.119 While the Court remanded on
the discriminatory intent claim for a reweighing of the evidence,120 it
affirmed the district court’s finding on the discriminatory effect claim,
holding that such an effect was present and remanded for a
determination of the appropriate remedy.121
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See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas S. Spencer, Administering Section 2
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In conducting the discriminatory purpose analysis, the Fifth
Circuit applied the well-known intent test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp122 and commonly used in traditional Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment analyses to determine whether direct or
circumstantial evidence support a finding that “a particular decision
was made with any discriminatory purpose, whether it was the
primary purpose or not.”123 The test consists of five, non-exhaustive
factors: “(1) the historical background of the decision, (2) the specific
sequence of events leading up to the decision, (3) departures from the
normal procedural sequence, (4) substantive departures, and (5)
legislative history, especially where there are contemporary
statements by members of the decision-making body.”124 Challengers
making this claim bear the original burden of showing that “racial
discrimination was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the
enactment of the law.”125 If this burden is met, the burden of proof is
shifted to the defenders of the law, who must show that the law would
have been enacted anyway, even without the discrimination factor.126
While the discriminatory intent/purpose framework for
section 2 claims uses the same analytical framework as wellestablished constitutional claims, there is no such consensus for the
“discriminatory effect”/”disparate impact” framework.127 The 1982
amendment to section 2 was in the midst of a period where section 2
was used mainly for vote dilution claims.128 So, there has been much
debate and uncertainty as to what type of analysis to use for vote
denial claims, the category under which challenges to voter ID laws
would fall.129
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(1977).
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See id. at 243.
128
See Tokaji, supra note 113, at 691.
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In 1986, a section 2 case reached the Supreme Court,130 and
while the case dealt with vote dilution, its principles have been viewed
as the benchmark for proving any section 2 effects claim. The Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff pursuing a section 2 disparate impact theory
must not only show that there was a disparate impact as a result of the
challenged practice, but that the impact resulted from that practice
“interact[ing] with social and historical conditions to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters
to elect their preferred representatives.”131 To determine whether the
impact is a product of this interaction, the Court adopted a set of
factors, now known as the “Gingles factors,” which were originally
enumerated by Congress in a Senate Committee report accompanying
the bill amending section 2.132 The factors are not exclusive, and not all
of them will be relevant in every case.133 In Veasey, the Fifth Circuit
chose to adopt a newly minted two-part framework already adopted
by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits and inspired by both the language of
section 2 itself134 and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Gingles.135 The
two elements of this framework are:
1.
“The challenged standard, practice, or
procedure must impose a discriminatory burden on
members of a protected class, meaning that members
of the protected class have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice;
[and]
2.
That burden must in part be caused by or
linked to social and historical conditions that have or
currently produce discrimination against members of
the protected class.”136
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Additionally, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits in deciding that the Gingles factors, and an overall
totality of the circumstances approach, should be used for the second
step, stating that they are effective in evaluating the causal link
between the disparate effects of the current law and the effects of past
and current discrimination.137 In applying this framework and
conducting the fact-intensive analysis required, the Fifth Circuit held
that the Texas voter ID law violated section 2 and had a discriminatory
effect on the voting rights of minorities in the state.138 It remanded the
remedy consideration to the district court, instructing the lower court
to create a remedy that ameliorated the violation while also respecting
the intent of the state legislature to combat voter fraud.139
II.

HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN DISENFRANCHISEMENT

Before moving to the analysis of North Dakota’s voter ID law,
it is important to highlight the historical underpinning of its
detrimental effect: the disenfranchisement of Native Americans. While
Native Americans have been the group on this continent the longest,
they have hardly been given the respect they deserve. Thanks largely
to the now-vilified actions of settlers, soldiers, and politicians who
continually drove them further west,140 spread disease,141 and fought
wars with them over land,142 Native Americans are not as numerous
as they once were. However, Native Americans still make up a sizeable
portion of the population in many states,143 and the national
137
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population is projected to continue trending upwards.144 Thus, for
fairness to both Native Americans as citizens of the United States and
to the integrity of elections conducted in this country, it is imperative
that states protect against discrimination, ensuring that Native
Americans not only have the opportunity to have their voices heard
but also making sure their voices count.
A.

Native American Disenfranchisement pre-VRA

For the first 136 years of America’s existence under the
Constitution, most Native Americans were denied the right to vote.145
Initially, Native Americans never wanted to be a part of this country
and had no desire to participate in the American political system;
during the earliest history of the United States, the country was
confined to the east of the Appalachian Mountains, and more than
eighty percent of the present-day country was occupied by selfgoverning Native Americans.146 However, three decisions made by
Justice Marshall, in what later became known as the Marshall trilogy,
set in motion the ultimate goal of robbing Tribal Nations of their
autonomy. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the first case, the Court held that
private citizens were not permitted to purchase native lands,147 while
the second and third cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v.
Georgia, established both the status of Native American tribes as nonforeign nations, in the former (meaning Native American tribes lacked
original jurisdiction to file suit in the Supreme Court), and the federal
government’s exclusive relationship with the “sovereign” tribes in the
latter (meaning that state laws were unenforceable against tribes).148
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The one survivor of true Native American autonomy after the
Marshall trilogy was continuing the traditional British practice of
purchasing desired Native land through treaties allowing tribes to
exercise self-governance over the land they still occupied.149 However,
as the “manifest destiny” concept permeated the political zeitgeist of
the time and the industrial revolution continued, Native Americans
were seen as an impediment to the economic development of the
burgeoning country.150 Thus, over time, the treaties based on the
principles established by the Marshall trilogy were ignored or willfully
violated, and Native Americans were driven further and further west,
both through governmental removal policies that forced them from
their home states and through bloody wars fought by the United States
against numerous tribes for their land and its resources.151 And in 1871,
with the passage of the Appropriations Act, the federal government
ended the treaty relationship altogether, instead establishing
dominant power over Native American tribes through statutes or
executive orders.152 By 1900, Native Americans had lost 95 percent of
the land they once held in 1800, and nearly all Native American tribes
were sequestered onto reservations.153 And in 1903, the Supreme Court
held that Congress could unilaterally disregard treaties made with
Native American tribes prior to 1871 through its “plenary power” over
Native lands.154
Now that Native Americans were deprived of their autonomy
and forced to develop a relationship with the United States federal
government, the question of citizenship eventually arose. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, passed shortly after the
conclusion of the Civil War, purported to guarantee to all citizens,
regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, due
process and equal protection under the laws, and the right to vote,155
though, of course, those guarantees were not actually realized until
149
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much later. Nevertheless, the citizenship question, and the question of
whether Native Americans had the right to vote, were debated after
those Amendments were enacted.
The contemporaneous answers to those questions can be
found in Elk v. Wilkins,156 decided in 1884 by the Supreme Court. In
interpreting the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,157
The Court first held that members of Native American tribes, even
though they were born within the geographic confines of the United
States, were not actually born in the country of the United States and
thus were not subject to its jurisdiction, as their allegiance was to their
tribe.158 Accordingly, those born within a tribe could not claim
birthright citizenship, likening this situation to that of a foreign
ambassador whose child is born within the United States.159 It further
held that, to become a naturalized citizen, a tribe member would have
to renounce his old allegiance to his tribe and become part of through
a formal means of naturalization, either by statute or under a treaty
adopted for the purpose of naturalization.160 In deciding the case on its
facts, the Court held that the plaintiff, a Nebraska man who was born
in a tribal nation but later abandoned his tribe to “adopt the habits and
manners of civilized people,”161 was not a citizen and therefore could
not vote in a Nebraska election because he had not been formally
naturalized by the United States government, even though he met all
other requirements to vote in Nebraska elections.162
The first large wave of Native American citizenship via
naturalization came by way of the Dawes Act.163 Enacted in 1887, the
Act’s result was the fractionation Native American tribal reservation
lands into smaller parcels, granted by the Government to individual
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Native Americans in what was known as “allotment.”164 Native
Americans held the allotments as individual property owners while
the leftover surplus land was sold to white settlers or corporations who
were hungry for western expansion.165 While the Dawes Act gave
hundreds of thousands of Native Americans United States
citizenship,166 its enforcement was often coerced, as pressure was
applied by the government through monetary payment and
deception.167 The Act also caused wide-ranging damage to Native
American tribal culture and tribal independence.168 Finally, much of
the allotted land was poor in agricultural quality, and many Native
Americans found it difficult to subsist off the land and were eventually
forced to sell or lease their interests to survive.169 The eventual failure
of the Dawes Act and “allotment” as a policy measure led to changes
in the government’s policy towards Native Americans in the early
twentieth century.170
Citizenship for all Native Americans would not be granted
until 1924, when Congress, shortly after World War I (where tens of
thousands of Native Americans fought, citizens and non-citizens alike)
and the expansion of the franchise to women,171 passed the Indian
164
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Citizenship Act.172 While all Native Americans born in or naturalized
by the United States should have now had the full array of benefits
that go along with citizenship, including the right to vote, that was not
the case. No matter what action was taken on the federal level at this
point in history to protect civil rights for discriminated groups, states
were still in nearly full control of which people voted in their
elections.173 And much like the tactics used by southern states to
disenfranchise African Americans during this time period, states with
a large Native American population began to do the same shortly after
all Native Americans became citizens. These states had success with
similar disenfranchisement techniques used in the South, such as
literacy tests, poll taxes, English language tests, and polling place
restrictions.174 These states also developed disenfranchisement
methods that were unique to Native American citizens, denying the
right to vote on the basis of a failure to sever tribal relations,175 a lack
of state taxing power,176 the classification of Native Americans as
“wards of the federal government” and disenfranchising them on the
same basis as the mentally insane,177 and failure to meet residency
requirements due to living on reservation land.178
B.

Native American Disenfranchisement post-VRA

Though these laws worked to deny the full nature of their
citizenship, Native Americans fought back with a vengeance, and in a
state-by-state approach, such laws were slowly struck down by federal
and state courts. By 1960, all of these discriminatory laws had been
struck down by courts or repealed by state legislatures, the last of
which being the Utah legislature abandoning its statute previously
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upheld residency statute in 1957.179 And the expansive VRA, enacted
in 1965, became a crucial buffer to guarantee that facially and forcibly
denying Native Americans (and all other vulnerable groups) the right
to actually cast a vote would never again be upheld in a court of law.
The VRA protected against the prevention of the franchise from Native
Americans in many ways. To start, the amended section 2 has greatly
helped all plaintiffs to establish dilution violations of the VRA, and it
has specifically helped Native Americans challenge many schemes
that would have been unassailable previously.180 Additionally, in the
1975 reauthorization, Congress adopted section 203, a provision which
requires states to provide all election information available in English
in another language if the jurisdiction in question meets the coverage
requirements.181 Notably for Native Americans, many of whom speak
languages that are historically unwritten, section 203 further provides
that the state or subdivision is also required to have oral instruction
and assistance for all registration and voting matters.182 Finally, and
arguably the most significant, section 5 of the VRA is a “preclearance”
provision, which requires state governments and political
subdivisions with a history of discrimination (determined by a
coverage formula)183 to obtain the approval of the federal government
before introducing any laws that changed state electoral procedures.184
This section has been maintained for every subsequent reauthorization
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See Windy Boy v. Big Horn County, 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1019, 1022 (D. Mont.
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of the VRA, with the last reauthorization in 2006 extending it through
2032.185
While the VRA has helped to prevent disenfranchisement
historically, its impact has been dampened in recent years thanks to
the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision Shelby County v. Holder.186 This case
saw five members of the Court, led by Chief Justice Roberts, declare
that the coverage formula used to determine which states and political
subdivisions were subject to section 5 was unconstitutional as
presently constructed, thus rendering the preclearance requirement
unenforceable.187 Congress had made no changes to the coverage
formula since 1975, even though they reauthorized the VRA again in
1982 and 2006, and for Justice Roberts and the majority, the formula,
based on data from over forty years ago, was not representative of the
present day nature of the country, and heavily burdened the states
subjected to it.188 The Court claimed that “the conditions that originally
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions.”189 However, to no surprise, this statement has proven to
be a fiction.190
This gutting of the VRA allowed many states and counties in
the South to escape federal preclearance before passing new election
laws, and it also did the same for states with a history of discrimination
against Native Americans, which includes the states of Alaska and
Arizona, and Oglala Lakota County and Todd County in South
Dakota, both of which contain a Native American reservation.191 For
example, in 2016, Arizona passed a law, known as HB 2023, which
made it a felony offense for a person other than a family member or

185
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caregiver to collect and deliver a voter’s ballot, colloquially known as
“ballot harvesting.”192 This change is one that clearly would have
required preclearance in a world without Shelby County. As the Ninth
Circuit noted in its decision overturning the law for violating section 2
of the VRA, Native American voters (and other vulnerable groups of
voters) are disproportionately affected by this law.193 In relaying the
factual findings of the lower court, it noted that residents living on
reservations were less likely to have accessible transportation, more
likely to have issues with mail-in voting and access to outgoing mail
services, and more likely to work multiple jobs and/or lack childcare
services to prevent travel to the polls, all of which place a substantial
adverse impact on voters in these communities and cause them to
resort more often to third-parties to turn in their ballots.194
Unfortunately, and somewhat unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in July 2021.195
The history of the fight for Native American enfranchisement
has gone on for hundreds of years, has arisen in various forms, and
has spawned numerous pieces of legislation to correct past wrongs.
While so much has changed over this time, one constant has remained:
the discriminatory disenfranchisement still exists. Even after the
granting of citizenship, the outlawing of Jim Crow-esque laws, and the
enactment and enforcement of the VRA, states and political
subdivisions continue to find new ways to disenfranchise Native
Americans. Shelby County has also made it much easier for previously
covered jurisdictions to pass discriminatory voting laws. Therefore,
ensuring that Native Americans receive a meaningful right to vote in
every election in which they desire to exercise one of their most
fundamental rights as citizens of the United States is of the utmost
importance. An achievable step in that goal is fighting against
restrictive voter ID laws that work in effect to weaken the access of
Native Americans to the franchise.
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III.
ANALYSIS OF NORTH DAKOTA AND WASHINGTON VOTER ID
LAWS
In melding these two unfortunate realities together, it is clear
that voter ID laws have the potential to be yet another way for states
to disenfranchise their indigenous populations. Voter ID laws
especially affect Native Americans living on reservations. Depending
on the state, such laws may require residential addresses, which
Native Americans living on reservations often lack, or may not accept
tribal IDs (ID cards issued by a Tribal Government or a Federal agency
working with such governments) as valid forms of identification, and
Native Americans living on reservations may be less likely to have a
valid state ID to use at the polls for a number of reasons, including
impediments to travelling long distances, economic hardships, and
lesser or no access to the internet.196 Additionally, even if a Native
American has obtained a voter ID that does not require a residential
address and allows, for example, a P.O. Box address, it may not match
the address in the county database system, often because such nontraditional addresses may create confusion, resulting in counties
reassigning a new address in the county system and placing the voter
in a new precinct without ever informing the voter of the change.197
As seen in the opening paragraph, this scenario played out in
parts of North Dakota prior to the 2018 election.198 While it is
disturbing that such events happen, the far more disturbing concern is
the laws that allow them to happen in the first place. North Dakota’s
voter ID law created this problem and many others, problems that
Washington’s voter ID law, amended in response to the events that
have occurred in North Dakota, has attempted to eliminate. More
states should follow Washington’s lead in working closely with their
Native American populations and attempting to ensure that they have
meaningful access to the franchise.
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North Dakota’s Voter ID Law: A Troublesome Tale

Before discussing the specifics of North Dakota’s voter ID law,
it is important to accentuate the context surrounding the state’s history
through different iterations of its voter ID law, and the events leading
up to the push toward its current form. During the 2012 elections,
Heidi Heitkamp, a Democratic candidate and a former state attorney,
surprisingly won a Senate seat in North Dakota, a traditional
Republican stronghold.199 The margin between Heitkamp and her
competitor was razor thin, with Heitkamp only winning by 3,000
votes.200 An increase in turnout by Native American voters helped
contribute to Heitkamp’s upset victory.201 Months later, however, the
State Legislative Assembly, controlled by Republicans, would take
action.202
The prior version of the voter ID law, passed in 2004, still
required voters to have a residential address on their identification
cards, but there were “fail-safe” mechanisms in place which allowed
voters to cast their votes even if they failed to meet the ID
requirements.203 In 2013, these mechanisms were completely
eliminated when the Legislative Assembly amended the voter ID
law.204 Under HAVA, states are usually not entitled to completely
remove completely the option of offering provisional ballots or a
199
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similar equivalent.205 However, because North Dakota is the only state
that does not require voter registration, and has not required it since
1951,206 it is exempt from the provisional ballot requirement and only
uses them if a court order has dictated that poll hours be extended.207
As a result, if a North Dakota voter showed up to the polls without
proper identification, she would be turned away and sent home,
unable to vote in any capacity.208 The amendment also reduced the
acceptable forms of ID to the narrowest of degrees, accepting only
state-issued or tribal government-issued ID cards, all of which must
provide the voter’s residential address.209 As previously mentioned,
this restriction has a much greater effect on Native Americans than on
other groups; voters living on reservations often lack residential
addresses and use PO boxes, which now failed to satisfy the new voter
ID law.210 The law was amended further in 2015, imposing further
restrictions which solidified the changes made two years prior.211 The
move to eliminate “fail-safe” provisions was unprecedented, as the
NCSL confirmed that no other state had enacted such a restrictive
voter ID law.212 While the state legislature insisted that these changes
were necessary to curb “voter fraud” in the state,213 it is hard to see
these changes as anything other than targeted disenfranchisement by
a politically-motivated (and potentially racially-motivated)
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52 U.S.C. § 21082(a); see also NCSL Provisional, supra note 53 (explaining
how the provisional ballot requirement is enforced and when it can be invoked).
206
See Logan Carpenter, Note, Voter Suppression or Election Integrity? The
Future of Voter Identification in North Dakota, 94 N.D. L. REV. 571, 574–77
(2019).
207
NCSL Provisional, supra note 53.
208
Carpenter, supra note 206.
209
See Brakebill v. Jaeger (Brakebill I), No. 1:16–cv–008, 2016 WL 7118548, at
*2 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016) (order granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction); HB 1332, 63rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
210
NARF, supra note 195.
211
Brakebill, 2016 WL 7118548, at *2; HB 1333, 64th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.D. 2015) (specifying the limited forms of acceptable ID and clarifying that
they must be current).
212
Brakebill, 2016 WL 7118548, at *2.
213
Id.

2021

COMBATING VOTER FRAUD OR DISENFRANCHISING

317

legislature, especially since there had only been one document case of
“voter fraud” in the history of North Dakota prior to their actions.214
Native American voters seemed to think so as well. Seven
Native Americans, all members of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians Tribe, subsequently filed a lawsuit in United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota against Secretary of
State Al Jaeger, in his official capacity, in 2016, challenging the voter
ID law’s state and federal constitutionality as well as its failure to
comply with the VRA, though the Court never ruled on this claim.215
Richard Brakebill and Elvis Norquay, two of the seven plaintiffs and
both veterans, were denied the right to vote in 2014 solely because they
failed to have a suitable residential address on their IDs.216 Lucille
Vivier and Dorothy Herman, two more plaintiffs, were also denied the
right to vote in 2014 for not having a proper residential address on
their tribal IDs.217 Brakebill and Herman in particular knew they
needed a new form of identification, but were unable to obtain a copy
of their birth certificates, and thus were barred from even receiving a
new state ID before the election.218 The plaintiffs were represented by
the Native American Rights Fund (“NARF”), an organization which
has provided legal assistance to tribes since 1970.219 For the upcoming
2016 General Election, the plaintiffs requested that a preliminary
injunction be entered against the amended law and that the prior law,
with its “fail-safe” provisions, be reinstated.220 They argued that the
needless, substantial, and disproportionate burdens placed on Native
Americans by the amended voter ID law would lead to thousands of
Native Americans being disenfranchised.221
214

See Election Fraud Cases North Dakota, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/search?state=ND (last visited Feb. 11,
2021).
215
Hannah Stambaugh, America’s Quiet Legacy of Native American Voter
Disenfranchisement: Prospects for Change in North Dakota After Brakebill v.
Jaeger, 69 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 295, 311 (2019).
216
NARF, supra note 203.
217
Brakebill, 2016 WL 7118548, at *8.
218
Id.
219
About Us, NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, https://www.narf.org/about-us/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
220
Brakebill, 2016 WL 7118548, at *2.
221
Id.

318

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 29

The burden of establishing the need for the preliminary
injunction is on the plaintiffs, and in following binding Eighth Circuit
case law, Judge Daniel Hovland determined whether that burden was
met by weighing the Dataphase factors, which include “(1) the threat of
irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this
harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on the other
parties litigant; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the
merits; and (4) the public interest.”222 No single factor can be
dispositive, and all factors will be weighed to determine, on balance,
whether the injunction should be granted.223 To begin this analysis, the
Court first analyzed factor three, the “most significant factor” in the
analysis.224 In doing so, the Court applied the balancing standard laid
out by Justice Stevens in Crawford for evaluating the voter ID law’s
constitutionality.225
First looking to the burdens if the ID requirements were not
enjoined, the Court held that the thorough record developed by the
plaintiffs, be given considerable weight.226 The Court specifically
noted statistical data from a survey of North Dakota voters and expert
witness testimony, both of which examined the disparate living
conditions for Native Americans as compared to non-Native
Americans, including lower average household incomes, higher
unemployment, a higher percentage of eligible voters not possessing a
qualifying voter ID and being unable to update them, substantial
travel and time burdens, and, of course, the residential address
requirement and lack of “fail-safe” provisions.227 All of these statistical
truths showed that a disproportionate burden was placed on Native
Americans, who would have a much harder time obtaining a
qualifying ID as compared to other groups.
Furthermore, the defendant did not refute any of these
findings, instead relying on Crawford and arguing both that the
222
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changes are necessary to combat voter fraud and that the burden of
making a trip and gathering appropriate documents to obtain a new
ID is not a substantial burden on the right to vote.228 However, in
Crawford, the Indiana law at least still allowed voters to cast
provisional ballots, and the outcome of that case has largely been
attributed to a poorly developed record.229 Here, conversely, the Court
notes that the record is replete with information of the excessively
burdensome requirements on Native American voters, and there are
no “fail-safe” provisions.230 And because there was virtually no record
of past or potential voter fraud in North Dakota, nor any other
compelling interest which supported the removal of the provisions,
the Court held that the burdens on Native American voters clearly
outweighed the State’s interests, and subsequently that the voter ID
law would violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause.231 The rest of the Dataphase factors were also met, as the
irreparable harm of being disenfranchised was clear and not
compensable through damages, the right to vote for voting-age Native
Americans outweighs any of North Dakota’s purported interests, and
North Dakota produced no evidence suggesting that public confidence
in elections would be undermined by allowing votes under “fail-safe”
provisions.232 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction was granted,233 and, at least for the 2016 election, thousands
of Native Americans would not be disenfranchised by North Dakota’s
voter ID law, as “fail-safe” options would be available for those
without proper identification.
But the story unfortunately does not end there. While the 2016
election went off without a hitch, the Legislative Assembly once again
amended the voter ID law in 2017.234 While state legislators claimed
this change to the law addressed the problems raised in Brakebill, the
law was essentially unchanged from the 2013 and 2015 iterations,
except for the allowance of voters without a qualifying ID to cast a
228
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provisional ballot and have that ballot counted if they showed up
within six days with the proper identification.235 The Brakebill plaintiffs
were rightfully angry, as this bill had done nothing to actually address
the issues raised by Judge Hovland and arguably ignored them to
continue suppressing otherwise qualified voters from exercising that
right. Thus, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to facially
challenge this newly amended version of the voter ID law.236 This time,
the District Court granted a limited preliminary injunction to bar the
state from implementing certain provisions.237 The Court held that this
new iteration still required voters to have the same forms of qualifying
ID’s that was earlier found to have a “discriminatory and burdensome
impact on Native Americans,” and with updated statistical data, the
plaintiffs showed that these burdens had not disappeared.238
Additionally, the State had still failed to present evidence of actual
voter fraud; therefore, the Court reiterated that “protecting the most
cherished right to vote for thousands of Native Americans who
currently lack a qualifying ID and cannot obtain one, outweighs the
purported interest and arguments of the State.”239 In granting the
partial injunction, the Court ordered the State to not enforce the
residential address requirement and accept all mailing addresses
(including P.O. boxes), expand the acceptable list of qualifying IDs and
supplemental documentation issued by tribal governments, and
clarify the procedure to have a provisional ballot counted.240
While the preliminary injunction was in force during the 2018
primaries, it would not survive in its full form to the midterm
elections. The State requested to stay the portion of the injunction
requiring its acceptance of any mailing address, and a divided panel
of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the request on
September 24, 2018, approximately six weeks before election day and
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after early voting had already began.241 To determine whether to issue
the stay, the Court applied a four-factor test that is nearly identical to
the Dataphase factors.242 The appellate court presented a different
calculation of the merits analysis, applying Crawford’s proposition that
a showing of excessively burdensome requirements on some voters
“does not justify broad relief that invalidates the requirements on a
statewide basis as applied to all voters.”243 Additionally, even though
the State failed to prevent any evidence of voter fraud, the Court still
held that the State would suffer irreparable harm if the residence
requirement was expanded, as the potential for scores of voters to vote
in the wrong precinct could lead to a dilutive effect that could affect
the outcomes of different elections.244
The Eighth Circuit’s focus was narrow, discussing only
residential addresses and omitting most of the statistics presented at
the lower court level which established the disproportionate burdens
placed on Native American voters in even obtaining a qualifying ID in
the first place. Additionally, the only “irreparable” harm the Court
sought to protect the State against was hypothetical voter fraud.245 The
real burdens placed on thousands of Native Americans deserved a
more thorough analysis from the Court, and its failure to conduct one
allowed it to give undeserved weight to non-existent concerns.246 After
241
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the issuance of this ruling, the plaintiffs filed an emergency appeal to
the Supreme Court to vacate the stay;247 however, their application
was denied 6-2, with Justices Kagan and Ginsburg dissenting from the
denial.248 The finalization of this decision came so close to election day,
and the risk of thousands of disenfranchised Native American voters
being unable to participate in the 2018 election was a real concern.
However, thanks to the united effort of NARF, four different Native
American tribes located in North Dakota,249 and two community
organizations to provide qualifying IDs free of charge,250 and despite
an instance of aforementioned bureaucratic incompetence nearly
getting in the way,251 Native American voter turnout hit record
highs.252
The Eighth Circuit eventually heard the appeal to the
preliminary injunction in 2019, where it officially overturned the
second preliminary injunction and held again that the plaintiffs were
not likely to succeed on the merits of their facial challenge to both the
residential address requirement and the requirement to present one of
the statutorily enumerated IDs.253 It seemed like the battle was far from
over, and that the risk of Native American disenfranchisement would
once again rear its ugly head at the 2020 general election. However,
with a denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and an upcoming trial
date,254 North Dakota reached out to the parties to settle, and a binding
247
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consent decree was entered thereafter.255 And as a result, safeguards
were put into place to protect the right to vote of Native Americans in
the state. One of the provisions of the decree requires the state to accept
as valid, for the purposes of voting, the designation of a voter’s
residential street address made by the Tribal Government, if the
address is within the Tribal Government’s jurisdiction.256 Some others
involve making sure that voters living on reservations have easy access
to free qualifying IDs.257 Finally, the decree allows voters using a tribal
ID to mark their residence on a map instead of using a numbered street
address for purposes of the residency requirement, whereby the
county 911 coordinator will then be required to assign a residential
street address to that location; thus, all the voter must do is show up
to vote with their residence marked on a map, and the onus is then on
the state to verify the official address of that location and ensure the
vote is counted.258 This unilateral process, deviating from the
provisional ballot procedure enacted in 2017, eliminates the need to
return to the polling place to verify a ballot that is set-aside, which is
very important for voters who live on reservations, as many of them
live far from polling sites or lack access to a regular form
transportation, which made these return trips challenging.259 Thus,
after seven long years, Native American voters in North Dakota will
finally be ensured equitable participation in the electoral process.
B.
Washington’s Voter ID Law: A Quicker, Easier and
More Just Potential Solution
The journey to ensuring equitable voting rights for Native
Americans in North Dakota was arduous, costly, and resulted in actual
255
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Lawsuits, BISMARCK TRIB. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/
state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/federal-judge-signs-settlement-in-north-dak
ota-voter-id-lawsuits/article_3dd58275-c9a3-56ea-9f71-58806bee95a8.html.
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disenfranchisement of some voters in two separate elections.260
Conversely, Washington’s solution to the potential problem was
quick, efficient, and relatively inexpensive. As part of its mission to
improve voting access, the state legislature enacted a Native American
Voting Rights Act, which took effect in July of 2019.261 The Bill
addressed many concerns in protecting the right to vote for Native
American citizens, and it was passed in response to the backlash
surrounding the 2018 North Dakota voter ID law.262 The Bill’s
protections include permitting Native Americans living on
reservations to submit a “non-traditional” address, such as a PO box,
on their voter registration applications, allowing a federally
recognized tribe to use a tribal government building as the
residential/mailing address for people living on the reservation,
permitting the use of tribal identification cards for submission of an
electronic registration application and not requiring a residential
address to be on a tribal identification card when presenting
identification at a voting center, allowing a federally recognized tribe
to designate a state facility located on the reservation to serve as a
voting registration center, and allowing a federally recognized tribe to
request and receive a ballot drop box and establish a pick up location
on the reservation.263 All of these protections make it easier for Native
Americans to both register to vote and to actually vote in elections, and
the allowance of non-residential addresses to count for Native
American voters greatly increases their ability to participate in
elections. Additionally, the placing of drop boxes on reservation land
attacks the noted travel burden.264
It is worth noting that the election landscape in Washington is
markedly different than in North Dakota. As just mentioned,
260
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Washington, like every state except for North Dakota, requires its
voters to register before voting.265 Additionally, most voting in
Washington takes place by mail,266 so the expansion of in-person voter
ID requirements specifically may not have much of an actual effect.
Thus, the specific changes made by Washington may not work for
every state, and it still remains to be seen how the changes themselves
will affect Native American turnout. However, it is clear that actions
by state legislatures are the quickest and most efficient way to attempt
to address the problem of discriminatory disenfranchisement, and on
the whole, they should be more interested in protecting the
fundamental rights of their citizens than in furthering their own
partisan interests.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Native American disenfranchisement, a practice that began in
the nineteenth century, is still an ongoing problem today. Yet Native
American voters are not alone in this reality. States and political
subdivisions continue to devise new ways to restrict the right to vote.
Voter ID laws have become yet another example of one such method
that can be used to disenfranchise not just Native Americans, but other
groups as well. Since the turn of this century, we have seen the number
of voter ID laws jump from fourteen to thirty-five, nine of which are
characterized as strict. For nearly all of these laws, the term “voter
fraud” is used as a defense and justification to severe restrictions on
the fundamental right to vote. The prevalence of this term, including
in areas that are not even correctly classified as “voter fraud,” would
make an ill-informed person believe that our election system is
rampant with liars and cheaters who are committing voter fraud to
“rig” elections. But in reality, actual voter fraud is rarer than a Florida
panther. This country has a long and ugly history of justifying
suppressive voting restrictions with combating “voter fraud”: poll
265
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taxes and white primaries are two such examples.267 However, that
ugly chapter has not closed yet, and now the causal chain, beginning
with the Thernstrom dissent and HAVA and leading through present
day, has led some states to use voter ID laws to become part of another
chapter in that story.268
While courts may be able to provide relief against these laws,
such lawsuits are exorbitant in cost, often span multiple years, and
require mountains of evidence to prove a claim. The Supreme Court
has done no favors on the constitutional front. By applying the
Anderson-Burdick standard instead of strict scrutiny in Crawford, it has
opened the door for far too much judicial deference, leading to results
like Brakebill III, where the Eighth Circuit was able to overturn the
injunction against North Dakota’s voter ID law simply by placing
more emphasis on preventing “voter fraud” and less emphasis on how
the law burdened Native Americans, achieved by omitting numerous
statistical data relied on by the lower court. It was crystal clear from
that data that this law was anything but a “minor burden” placed on
Native American voters. Perhaps an “as-applied” challenge would
have fared better, but regardless, the balancing standard, as shown in
this case is far too amenable and can be abused.
Voter ID laws challenged under Section 2 of the VRA are not
much easier and may even be more expensive.269 Discriminatory
purpose claims can often be “slam-dunk” cases if the intent can be
shown.270 But proving intent can often be a difficult task, as it requires
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a very thorough analysis which raises the costs of the litigation,271 and
the hard evidence of legislative intent may not even exist. Effects
claims brought under Section 2 may not be any easier, as pursuing a
disparate impact theory in vote denial cases is still in its infancy.272
Thus, challenging a voter ID law in this way would be both costly and
risky. So, what then is the most effective avenue to overturn these
discriminatory laws?
The answer is state legislatures. These representatives need to
begin working closely with their electorates to ensure that the right to
vote, one of the most fundamental rights of United States citizens, is
not “denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”273 In North Dakota’s case, the changes made
in its voter ID law went against this principle and could have
disenfranchised thousands of Native Americans in three separate
elections, though the actions of a wise judge and the united effort of
Native American Rights advocates and Tribal Nations nearly
eliminated that reality in the 2016 and 2018 elections, respectively. In a
country that portrays itself as a beacon of democracy, fundamental
civil rights like the right to vote should never be discriminatorily
sacrificed for political power plays. An example of a state legislature
who understands its responsibility in upholding these democratic
values is Washington’s, which went out of its way to listen to and
address the real concerns of its Native American citizens. The rest of
the states should soon follow in Washington’s path and amend or
remove restrictive voter ID laws and other voting laws that do nothing
to combat the mythical “voter fraud” and only serve to disenfranchise
otherwise eligible voters. Native Americans, Black Americans, and all
other vulnerable groups deserve more from a country that has
constantly taken from them. They deserve a meaningful, valuable, and
equitable right to vote.
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